SOCIAL DISTANCES IN INTERETHNIC RELATIONS
THROUGH THE EYES OF ETHNIC BULGARIANS AND TURKS

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Abstract: The article gives answers to many questions related to the state and perspectives of development of interethnic relations in Bulgaria, specifically as concerns the trend of development of national identity of the basic ethnic groups (Bulgarians and Turks). These questions include: whether national identity is moving towards greater ethnicization, i.e., towards collective and ethno-cultural definition of their national affiliation, or else to a more clearly defined prevalence of the civic national identity, with which every citizen of the country, regardless of his/her ethnic or religious background, has equal individual rights as all others.

The author describes how the individual choice of the type of national identity of the two ethnic communities impacts on the interethnic relations in the country.

Key words: ethnicity; social distances; social exclusion; social integration.

Societies today are characterized by cultural diversity and ethnic differences. These features are accompanied by growing tension due to social exclusion, which has a negative impact on social integration. Yet integration, for its part, should not be viewed as an entirely positive fact. In various respects, it is double-edged. Internal solidarity fosters cooperation, social control, and, possibly, subordination to the norms of the group. On the other hand, strong internal group solidarity might lead to animosity, hatred of the others, and ultimately to xenophobia; in the worst case, to extreme behaviour. The range of effects spans from feeling of belonging (in which differences from the other are erased), passes through tolerance, and may reach intolerance and violence.

Ethnic identity is a social construction situated in the framework of a specific historical context. Many factors influence its way of formation. At the present time, the connection to geographic location is decreasing. Many of the representatives of ethnic minorities have some transnational experience. The world is changing not only for those who travel and migrate but also for those who remain in the same place. Moreover, immigrants are influenced not only by their own group remaining at the place of their former residence but likewise by
their ethnic group in the new place and new environment. This influence may be related to one or more countries, places, communities, connected through transnational communities.

In recent years there has been a remarkable, unexpected and unforeseen revival and activation of religious fundamentalism. This is obviously in contradiction with the main postulate of modernization theory, which asserts that modernization tends to replace the specific ties of kinship and ethnic affiliation with the universal principles of cultural tolerance and impartial norms of law based on the principles of shared citizenship. All of the founding figures of modern sociology believed that the growth of modern institutions would progressively weaken the central social institutions of religion and ethnicity.

The theorists of modernization did not believe that the trend from traditionalism to modernism, from ascription to attainment, or from particularism to universalism, would be ubiquitous or uniform amidst the institutional complexity of increasingly differentiated societies. But they saw this trend as more or less inevitable and even desirable.

One argument, which looks convincing in support of multiculturalism, is that it promises to stimulate personal growth in an inclusive society, and a united citizenship that holds shared values. Moreover, it promises a high degree of social inclusion, which was inconceivable in pre-modern societies, where whole classes of the population were effectively excluded from the governance of the state.

For many years the theory of modernization was prevalent. It opened the way to postmodernism, which, in turn, was overtaken by globalization theory and thus returned to the themes put forward by the earlier theory of modernization. Whatever the specific views as to these general theoretical questions, it is a fact that we are witnessing the breakdown of previously inclusive but ethnically differentiated states into ethnically more homogenous nations; social solidarity is disrupted as a result of ethnic conflicts and the inadmissible process called “ethnic cleansing”. Ultimately, the religious fundamentalism today is reviving even in the most industrialized states, marginalized groups are increasingly excluded due to the fundamental social institution of the labour market. The unemployment rate in industrialized states has reached unacceptably high levels, especially among young people. There is a widespread threat, and actual occurrence, of conflicts between communities. The fact is that all large armed conflicts in the world are basically related to ethnic conflicts.

The roots of this revival of ethnic and religious links stretch beyond the social, political and historical contexts. In some regions this revival reflects nationalist feelings that have followed decolonization and the movement toward political autonomy. This religious revival is perhaps a necessary rather than unexpected characteristic of late modernity, simply because religious fundamentalism offers solutions for the existential dilemma arising from radical doubts with regard to modern society, morals and ethos. In states with high immigration rates, governments are encouraging religious differences through multiculturalist policies in support of ethnic diversity; they are doing this partially due to the potential electoral advantages that ethnic lobbies provide for parties that fervently proclaim ethnicity.
At the same time, ethnic differences may be presented as amounting to a threat to national unity. The dissemination of racist allusions, or assertions, that certain ethnic groups enjoy unjust advantages is aimed at a reconsideration of state policies regarding these groups. In this connection, speculative claims are made about the threat that the majority may be assimilated by the minorities; the unacceptable way of life, culture and religion of certain groups, their unwillingness to integrate, are widely discussed themes. The view is put forward that a truly multicultural state can never be strong or united. The opinion that multiculturalism is problematic is not limited to a single ethnic group or a single country.

The problem of multiculturalism is incorrectly defined if it is taken as being a case where the culture of the majority is in confrontation with the cultures of the minorities. There is always a civic culture that prescribes the limits and conditions under which different groups will mutually influence each other and will interact. A society may well adopt a purely civic culture based on the idea of equality, and may then require that all groups abide by that culture and be emotionally and morally committed to the values and common civic culture of the country. In that case, the groups will thereby contribute to the sustainability of civic culture and identity without being assimilated by the national culture and identity.

Cultural diversity is often perceived as a threat to civic culture; it is said that “multiculturalism has failed”. But it has not been made clear whether states fail because they are multicultural or because they are poor. A more likely explanation for this failure is that states have not succeeded in producing political elites of proper quality. Once they gain power, these elites continue to reproduce themselves, but they have no consensual view as to the important national goal and tasks. The only thing they strive for is ethnic advantages.

Ethnic relations have been the object of many studies and an enormous amount of literature on this topic exists. Some authors deal with the aspects of ethnic differences and obstacles in the sphere of labour or marital relations. Others treat of civic culture, citizenship and national identity. Social surveys have dealt with how these identities are built and focused on class identity; other surveys have developed a broader understanding of identity by using the terms of Durkheim’s typology and defining in-groups and out-groups associated, respectively, with positive or negative feelings.

Among the interesting conclusions drawn in contemporary surveys on interethic relations in our country is that economic status is a weak source for personal identity as regards being “a Bulgarian”. It also seems that those Bulgarians who are strongly attached to symbolic borderlines of the national community tend to support multiculturalism less than the other ethnic groups. The attitude scale reflects aspects of what it means to be a “genuine Bulgarian” and seeks to ascertain the existing attitudes towards national feelings and xenophobia. The conclusions are that, for the majority of respondents, in order to “feel Bulgarian” it is important to be “a true citizen”. By the latter, they mean a person’s respect for the institutions and the law [Zlatanova, Stamenova, Ermenov, 2013].

The correlation between ethnic and national identity reflects likewise the respondents’ attitudes towards the rest of the indicators: views on aspects of life in the country, nationalism or chauvinism, attitudes towards the different eth-
nic groups, towards neighbours or marital partners of a different origin, preferences and prejudices (xenophobia).

The social-structural foundations of national identity are different in the different subgroups: young vs. old; city vs. village; groups by education level; religious believers vs. non-believers; dogmatists; liberals, nationalists; there is also a variety of views regarding currently topical social themes such as the growing crime rate, the economic crisis, employment and unemployment, integration policies, etc. [Zlatanova et al., 2013].

Other survey topics have been attitudes towards the basic social institutions, the laws and equality before the law, liberties, religion, forms of tolerance, equal opportunities, poverty, unemployment, the ethnic map in politics, tolerance as a topic in the media and in schools [Mantarova and Zaharieva, 2007].

The present article aims to present a detailed picture of social distances between ethnic Bulgarians and Turks in Bulgaria. The conclusions are based on analysis of data obtained from the research project conducted by a team of the Institute for the Study of Societies and Knowledge at BAS.

Social Distances Seen through the Eyes of Ethnic Bulgarians

The analysis of the survey results shows that there are small social distances towards with respect to the ethnic minorities in the country; small distances are primarily determined by support for the non-corporative representation of the interests of the country’s separate ethnic communities, a view that expects people in leading government positions to defend the interests of all citizens, regardless

1 Social distances are measured using the Bogardus scale.
2 The project was funded by the National Science Fund דО-203/2008-2013.
3 The research team included: Prof. DSc Valentina Zlatanova – head of team, Head Assist. Prof. Svetlana Stamenova, and Head Assist. Prof. Dr Boyan Ermenov.
4 In the framework of the project, three public opinion surveys were conducted, during which a total of 1,800 persons were interviewed. The surveys included:
   a) A nation-wide survey of the adult population of the country, in which 1000 persons were interviewed;
   b) A survey of the adult Turkish population living in Bulgaria, encompassing 800 persons;  
      A two-stage cluster sample was applied; at the first stage 200 electoral section were selected, with a probability proportionate to their size; in the second stage, starting from a set address in each electoral section, 5 respondents were sought out according to gender and age. Thus the size of the sample amounted to 1000 persons in the first survey. In this method, the maximum stochastic error at 95% guarantee probability is 3.1% for a 50% relative share. The preliminary stratification of the data from which the sample was formed was based on place of residence, a trait that guarantees proportionate representation of all regions of the country.
      In the representative sample of adult Turks in Bulgaria were included all the country’s administrative districts where Bulgarian Turks reside, and in each of the districts this ethnic group was represented proportionately to the Turkish population residing in the district. On this basis were selected 160 clusters – the preliminary stratification was based on place of residence. For each cluster, a starting address and a sampling skip were set. 5 respondents were interviewed in each cluster; they were selected on the basis of ethnic affiliation, gender and age. The size of the sample was 800 persons.
5 In present analysis the social distances towards ethnic minorities, cultural and political national pride, political and patriotic national identity, and national emotions represented additive scales formed on the basis of the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for measuring reliability
of ethnic background. Respectively, the large social distances on the part of the Bulgarian majority with respect to the minorities are related to the support for corporate representation of the interests of ethnic groups in the country, whereby people in leading government positions defend the interest only of their own ethnic community and, hence, sustain the corporate division of government power. Here we should recall that such a representation of the interests of ethnic communities amounts to a division of power based on ethnic background along the whole vertical scale of government, down to the level of local government.

The survey results indicate a high degree of political tolerance towards the ethnic minorities, the recognition of their right to independent political and cultural organizations and their right to study their maternal tongue in state schools. On the other hand, low levels of political tolerance are related to lower social tolerance on the part of the majority. This means there is a correspondence between social tolerance towards minority ethnic groups and the Bulgarian majority’s support for collective rights of minorities ($\beta = 0.14^{**}$). In an independent regression, political tolerance explains social tolerance for 7% of the sample$^6$.

Multiculturalism and the rejection of the integration model of relations between the minorities and the Bulgarians also decreases the social distances of Bulgarians to the ethnic minorities ($\beta = 0.16^{**}$). Lack of cultural or economic xenophobia is a characteristic feature of the low social distances towards the ethnic minorities on the part of ethnic Bulgarians. So far the results match the theoretical lines of interethic tolerance, where political and social tolerance go hand in hand, and multiculturalism and the lack of xenophobia towards immigrants are a natural feature of this social tolerance.

A decisive factor is the degree of the attachment of respondents to their own ethnic group; this factor calls in question the theoretically assumed “destructive effect” of attachment towards one’s ethnic group with respect to interethic tolerance ($\beta = 0.15^{**}$). It turns out that the greater the attachment of Bulgarian respondents towards their own ethnic group, the more socially tolerant they are towards minorities in the country, and weak attachment towards their own ethnos increases – rather than decreases – the social distances of Bulgarians towards ethnic minorities. Thus the Bulgarians’ sense of ethnic belonging not only does not increase their social intolerance of ethnic minorities in our country, but, on the contrary, decreases social distances towards other ethnic groups. This makes questionable the presumed “destructive effect” of ethnic attachment on interethic relations.

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$^6$ $\beta = 0.26^{**}$.
Political Tolerance

*Political tolerance* is based on an integral political-ideological set of factors, which include strong support for state-funded multiculturalism, strong national political pride and support for the democratic order, combined with rejection of ethnic national identity, and small social distances towards ethnic minorities in our country. It could be said that Bulgarians’ political tolerance is an ideological construction based on small social distances towards the other ethnic communities in the country, and on support for the country’s political regime.

The support for the *non-corporative representation of interests of ethnic communities* could be expected to be based on Bulgarians’ fears of irredentism and eventual ethnic partitioning of the country. But in fact this support is correlated to small social distances towards the ethnic minorities; this refutes the hypothesis that fear is the most important factor of support for this model. Feelings of national attachment also increase approval for non-corporative representation of community interests. Fear of irredentism⁷ is reflected in the approval of the integrational model of relations between minorities and the majority, and in the rejection of state-sponsored multiculturalism. There is a weak correlation between rejection of political identity and support for non-corporative representation of the interests of ethnic communities on the part of the Bulgarians (β = 0.174**), which automatically shifts the country’s political national identity to corporative, or con-societal,⁸ representation of the interests of ethnic groups.

Civic vs. Ethnic Principles of Inclusion in the National Community

The *ethnic principle of participation in the community* is based on ethnic and patriotic national identities, on low political tolerance towards ethnic minorities in our country, and on the integration model of relations between ethnic minorities and the majority. The *civic model of inclusion* is based on strong political tolerance towards minorities and above all on social-structural determinants: high income and the possibility to save part of one’s income is the strongest factor for Bulgarians’ support of the civic model of inclusion in the nation. Purely political determinants, such as dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in our country, and the high specific or diffuse political support, also increase the extent of the civic option for participation in the national community. Data analysis shows that there is no connection between political national identity and the civic choice for inclusion, whereas social-structural determinants are a strong factor here. Surprisingly, economy-related xenophobia towards immigrants also strengthens the civic approach to national belonging, while in the ethnic approach this correlation with attitudes to immigrants is missing. Evidently, the civic approach to inclusion in the national community, far from decreasing, actually enhances economic xenophobia towards immigrants.

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⁷ (Political) movement intended to reclaim and reoccupy some foreign territory to justify its territorial claims on the basis of (real or imagined) historic, ethnic, religious or linguistic affiliations.

⁸ Division of government powers based on ethnicity.
The survey has shown that national feelings of Bulgarians are not based on an ethnic but on a political national identity, on political national pride and on pride in being a Bulgarian citizen. The most interesting result related to national feelings is their correlation with authoritarian political trends ($\beta = -0.164^{**}$). The belief that, under certain conditions, dictatorship may play a positive role correlates with stronger national feelings. And to the contrary: the support for the opinion that, despite all its problems, democracy is the best form of government, is correlated with significantly lower national feelings of Bulgarians. Hence, we may conclude that the national sentiments of ethnic Bulgarians are primarily politically defined. The factors that connect national feelings with interethnic relations are the civic, or non-corporative, choice of representation of interests of ethnic communities and support for multiculturalism understood as preservation and reproduction of the traditions and customs of the ethnic minorities.

Our analysis has shown that the kind of national feelings, that in West European countries are linked to low tolerance of ethnic minorities (and immigrants), are correlated in our country with approval for the multicultural variant of relations between the majority and the minorities. We find that the national feelings of Bulgarians are not linked to intolerant trends; on the contrary, they are connected with support for multiculturalism. However, this tolerance does not apply towards the economic activity of eventual immigrants in Bulgaria.

The attachment of respondents to their ethnic community is determined both by their ethnic and political national identities and the national feeling of Bulgarians: this confirms once again that Bulgarians do not look upon their ethnic identity as opposed to their political national identity. The most interesting determinant of attachment to one’s ethnic group is the small social distance to ethnic minorities in the country: social tolerance increases, rather than decreases, the attachment of Bulgarians to their ethnic community ($\beta = 0.114^{**}$). A high level of religiousness also enhances the respondents’ attachment to their own ethnic community, and decreases social tolerance ($\beta = -0.19^{**}$).

We find that the question as to Bulgarians’ pride in their ethnic origin gives somewhat different results. The strongest determinant of ethnic pride is, once again, related to civic-political terms: it is pride in Bulgarian citizenship ($\beta = 0.562^{**}$), which indicates that, in their minds, ethnic Bulgarian respondents do not make a difference between ethnic group and citizenship. Pearson coefficient of correlation between these two variables in the sample shows strong dependence ($r = 0.655^{**}$). Patriotic national identity ($\beta = 0.27^{**}$) and strong cultural national pride ($\beta = 0.285^{**}$), also enhance ethnic pride ($\beta = 0.20^{**}$), but political national identity strongly diminishes Bulgarians’ pride in their ethnic origin and decreases their preference for a civic-political model of inclusion in the national community ($\beta = -.063^*$). Thus, political national identity may be in harmony with Bulgarians’ attachment to their own ethnic group, yet it considerably decreases their pride in their ethnic origin. The cause of this may lie in the quality of the political institutions with which Bulgarians must identify in order to achieve a stronger political national identity (according to the theories on the civic-political definition of the national community). These institutions are the general social welfare system, the political and judiciary system, and the
national economy. The collapse of these three institutions in the course of 25 years since the start of the transition in Bulgaria provoked the mass demonstrations of February 2013 and 2014 in protest against the political status quo and even against the political system itself. We find that the national feelings and Bulgarians’ pride in their ethnic affiliation are the main bases of identification; they reflect the social-political problems of the national community. The basic social-structural carriers of pride in Bulgarian ethnic origin, as well as of national feelings, are the low social strata of workers. The complete lack of influence of ethnic national identity upon the Bulgarians’ pride in their ethnic origin once again shows that the rejection of political national identity is related not to an alternative ethnic identity but to the very quality of political institutions that constitute the essence of political national identification.

Bulgarians’ national feelings and pride in their ethnic origin contain the greatest force for social-political mobilization towards changing the political status quo, while the ethnic components of national consciousness are most strongly connected with social tolerance towards the country’s minorities.

As regards Bulgarians’ political tolerance for ethnic minorities, the analysis of the survey results shows that ethnic national identity decreases the political tolerance towards ethnic minorities but does not decrease social tolerance towards them. Moreover, political national identity is not connected with political or social tolerance towards the minorities. Hence, it cannot be relied that political national identity, as modernization theories have suggested, will strengthen political tolerance towards the minorities, data show converse correlation ($\beta = -0.152^{**}$).

The small social distances are closely related to political tolerance towards the minorities and to the civic (non-corporative) choice of political representation of the interests of ethnic communities in our country; they are also linked to support for a multicultural type of relationships between the minorities and the ethnic majority. The social, not the political, tolerance of Bulgarians towards minorities is what decreases both cultural and economic xenophobia towards immigrants. In the opposite the national sentiments reinforce economic xenophobia towards ethnic minorities and especially immigrants ($\beta = 0.115^{**}$).

When comparing these findings with the results of previous studies on interethnic relations [Mantarova and Zaharieva, 2007], we may say that the effect of religiousness and residence in small settlements upon the social distances of Bulgarians has dissolved during the past period. What has remained a factor of increased social tolerance of Bulgarians towards the ethnic minorities is the feeling of attachment to one’s ethnic community; this result contradicts the modernization theory of interethnic relations.

**Social Distances Through the Eyes of Turks in Bulgaria**

The respective determinants of social distances felt by the Turks towards the ethnic majority in the country and towards the other ethnic minorities differ significantly. Turks’ social distances towards Bulgarian Muslims and the Roma are determined primarily by the patriotic national identity of Turks in Bulgaria, by their feeling of cultural national pride, of a common national character and shared symbols, which make them feel Bulgarian citizens. The feeling of shared
symbols and shared national character enhances the social tolerance felt by the Turks towards the other minority communities in the country. The rejection of ethnic national identity based on Bulgarian ethnic origin also decreases the social distances with respect to the other minorities in our country, while the adoption of this type of identity increases social distances towards the minorities. The pride felt by Turks in their ethnic origin also increases the social tolerance towards the minorities, which means that their ethnicity is not an obstacle for the Turks to be socially tolerant of the other minorities; on the contrary, it decreases social distances towards the latter. Dissatisfaction with the way democracy functions in our country is a purely political factor that enhances social tolerance of Turks with respect to the other ethnic minorities. No social-structural factors are impacting on social distances felt by Turks towards the minorities.

The source of social tolerance towards the ethnic Bulgarian majority is different. Still, we find that Turks’ small social distances towards Roma and Bulgarian Muslims is accompanied by smaller distances towards Bulgarians. In this sense, social tolerance towards all ethnic communities in the country is an indivisible set that operates as a connected whole: social tolerance felt towards minorities means social tolerance towards the ethnic majority as well and, reversely, decreased social tolerance towards the minorities entails increased social distance towards the Bulgarians.

The choice of non-corporative, civic representation of ethnic communities’ interests also has a significant impact on social tolerance felt by Turks in our country towards Bulgarians ($\beta = 0.29^{**}$), while preference for corporative, ethnic-based representation of interests considerably increases their social distance towards the Bulgarian ethnic majority. Pride in possessing Bulgarian citizenship also decreases these social distances and increases the social tolerance towards Bulgarian majority ($\beta = 0.165^{**}$).

With decreasing the attachment to their own ethnic group increasing social tolerance towards Bulgarians among Turkish respondents is observed ($\beta = -0.104^{**}$), as well as shorten social distances between these ethnic groups ($\beta = -0.104^{**}$). This indicates that an eventual trend towards stronger feeling of attachment to their own ethnic group and stronger religiousness most likely would decrease their social tolerance towards Bulgarians.

The social-structural and demographic determinants have a relatively large weight as regards the Turks’ social distances towards the Bulgarian majority, larger than for their social distances towards the ethnic minorities. Income level, education level, and place of residence, in addition to religiousness, also have an influence on social tolerance towards the majority. Turkish respondents with higher income, better education, and residing in large cities display smaller social distances towards Bulgarians. The basic social-structural factors that might provoke a decrease of Turks’ social tolerance towards the Bulgarian majority are high religiousness, poverty, low education level, and residence in villages. No influence upon social distances towards Bulgarians is found to result from the type of national identity or from multicultural vs. integration factors of the relations between ethnic minorities and the majority.

The high political tolerance towards minority ethnic groups is characteristic of the residents of villages where ethnic minorities are the predominant popula-
tion and among the well-educated Turks. This tolerance is based on strong support for state-sponsored multiculturalism, a high degree of attachment to the Turks’ own ethnic community, and strong support for the multiparty political system ($\beta = 0.361^{**}$). Hence, it may be said that support for collective rights of ethnic minorities or support for independent cultural and political organizations of minorities, in the framework of which they may reproduce their specific ethnicity, language and culture, is primarily demographically determined and is characteristic of villages in which minorities are the predominant group. Where national political institutions of the state are lacking, and there is not a large presence of people from the majority, the need for institutions becomes greater among the locally predominant ethnic minority, as well as the obvious support for extreme policy of multiculturalism ($\beta = 0.25^{**}$).

**Civic and Ethnic Principles of Inclusion in the National Community**

Among Turks, the rejection of ethnic Bulgarian origin as the main foundation for inclusion in the national community in Bulgaria is not linked to acceptance of the civic-political principle of participation in the nation, based on respect for the political laws and institutions of the country, but is related mostly to rejection of ethnic national identity as based on Bulgarian ethnic origin. The political and patriotic national identities likewise have no influence on rejection of ethnic origin as a factor of participation in the nation. However, pride in Bulgarian citizenship increases the degree of rejection of the ethnic principle of inclusion in the national community and increases the acceptance of the civic-political model of participation. The self-definition of Turks as belonging to the Turkish nation also increases the rejection of the ethnic principle of inclusion in the national community, while Turks’ feeling of belonging to the Bulgarian nation rather leads to their acceptance of the ethnic principles of participation in the nation.

*Respect for Bulgarian political institutions and laws, viewed as a way of inclusion in the nation,* is not based on rejection of the ethnic principle of inclusion in the national community, but on patriotic and political national identities among the Turks, on national feelings, and above all, on a purely demographic factor: the quantitative ratio between ethnic minorities and the ethnic majority in the settlements in which respondents reside. We find that in the settlements where the Bulgarian ethnic majority is predominant in the local population, respect for political institutions and laws is much higher than in places where the ethnic minorities are more numerous than the Bulgarian ethnic group. The weight of this demographic factor leads us to the conclusion that the civic-political model of participation in the nation is strongly dependent on demography and is assessed by the Turks in Bulgaria as very important precisely in the regions where the Bulgarian ethnic group is numerically predominant over the minorities. Where ethnic minorities make up the greater part of the local population, support for the civic-political principle of participation in the national community, based on respect for Bulgarian institutions and laws, is weak or entirely absent. Moreover, support for this principle is in line with the political and patriotic na-
ational identities and is typical for respondents who have strong national feelings and prefer to be citizens of Bulgaria than of some other country. As national feelings grow weaker, so does the support for the civic-political principle of participation in the nation among Turkish respondents.

Respect for Bulgarian political institutions and laws is a function of the demographic factor and of attachment to the nation and country; it is not a function of the rejection of the ethnic principle of inclusion in the nation. The rejection of the ethnic principle of participation is based on rejection of the ethnic national identity based on Bulgarian ethnic origin. The index of national sentiments reflects positive attitudes towards Bulgaria and Bulgarians9. The strongest determinant of national sentiments is political national pride $\beta = 0.275^{**}$: The growth of political pride increases the national sentiments, in reverse, its decreasing leads to loss of political sentiments. The pride of Bulgarian citizenship ($\beta = 0.21^{**}$) and respect for Bulgarian political institutions and legislation ($\beta = 0.21^{**}$) also give rise to national sentiments stimulation. Pride in Bulgarian citizenship is the general determinant, characteristic both for the rejection of the ethnic principle of inclusion and for the civic-political principle of participation in the nation. These two principles – ethnic and civic-political – are related to various phenomena and are not part of a unified continuum in the minds of Turkish respondents; among them, the rejection of the ethnic principle does not correspond to acceptance of the civic-political principle of inclusion in the national community.

Bulgarian Turks’ feeling of attachment to the ethnic community and pride in their ethnic origin are two somewhat related independent variables, but they are determined in different ways. While pride in ethnic origin is inseparably linked (as it is in the case of ethnic Bulgarians) to pride in Bulgarian citizenship, the Turkish respondents’ attachment to their ethnic community is based primarily on their support for independent political and cultural reproduction of their specific ethno-cultural identity, as well as their support for the study of the Turkish language in state schools. The data analysis shows that the support for collective rights and independent cultural and political reproduction of the minority ethnic groups in our country has no impact on pride in ethnic origin among Turks10. Attachment to the ethnic community is demographically dependent on the category of settlement: residents of villages feel closer to their ethnic community than Turks living in cities. Religiousness is also a factor of attachment to their own ethnic group and of pride in their ethnic origin. The younger Turkish respondents feel prouder of their ethnic affiliation but are not more attached to their ethnic community.

The increase of cultural national pride of the Turkish ethnic community in Bulgaria leads to increasing of political pride ($\beta = 0.454^{**}$), which is also increased by the strong national feelings ($\beta = 0.21^{**}$).

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9 Include statements as: “World will be better place if people from other countries are very much like Bulgarians”; “I prefer to be Bulgarian instead of being citizen of any other country”; “In general, Bulgaria is better country than most of the other countries”; “People should support mother country nevertheless if it is in the wrong.”
The survey has shown that, both among ethnic Bulgarians and ethnic Turks, authoritarian attitudes have a positive effect on national feelings; the effect is stronger among Bulgarians than among Turks.

Pride in Bulgarian citizenship has an impact on national feelings both among Bulgarians and Turks. In both ethnic groups we register an increase of national feelings with age. This means that among the younger generation of Turks and Bulgarian Muslims, national feelings tend to be considerably weaker; this trend is somewhat more strongly pronounced among Turks.

The social integration between the different ethnic groups may be organized along social lines; solidarity and cohesion is based to a greater degree on social equality than on ethnic integration.

We must not overlook the circumstance that the ethnic majority often perceives the rights of minorities as a threat to its dominant position and higher social status; this attitude might have negative consequences. Compared with the minority, the minorities have stronger group identification and more positive attitudes towards equality and equal opportunities, and they attach less importance to the social cohesion and unity of the nation. The fact that, according to the opinion both of the majority and the minorities, ethnic minorities generally have a lower social status may be a cause of their stronger identification with their own ethnic groups.

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